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ABSTRACT
Discussion on overcapacity of lodging industry has persisted among academics and
industry. Despite a general agreement on its negative effects, efforts to quantify overcapacity
and investigate its cause have significantly lacked. Suspecting that these efforts are hindered
by the present difficulty in evaluating the optimum capacity, this study provides a conceptual
framework of a revenue-maximizing industry capacity under the theory of fundamental price.
Moreover, as capacity decision is made before the demand is known, the effect of demand
uncertainty on capacity decision is examined in conjunction. Results suggest that the US
lodging industry has incentive to maintain excess capacity under demand uncertainty, while
pronounced overcapacity cycles seem to be a result of demand shocks. Implications for the
industry and suggestions for future research are discussed with the findings of the study.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since Dev and Hubbard (1989) introduced the term oversupply, the academia has
frequently cited its adverse impact on the US lodging industry. Consequences of oversupply
have been identified in the preceding literature, such as reduced average daily rates
(Overstreet, 1989), lower occupancy rates (Mao & Gu, 2007), financial downturn (Brown &
Dev, 1999), and less credit for investors due to expectation on impaired future cash flows
(Singh & Kwansa, 1999). In spite of the undesirable nuance the term bears, historical periods
of oversupply have been repeatedly observed (Mao & Gu, 2007; Ferreira & Gustafson, 2006).
Despite the adverse effects and recurrences of oversupply, there has been a lack of
discussion on the causes of oversupply. Some studies have noted funds from the REITs sector
(Kim, Gu, & Mattila, 2002) and rise in property values (Rushmore & Baum, 2002) as
potential drivers behind oversupply. While these are compelling reasons for the industry’s
capacity surge, there seems to be a missing link as these are causes of overbuilding that led to
oversupply. Overbuilding is considered as an irrational behavior of adding supply despite
lack of demand (Grenadier, 1996). However, there is a time lag between the construction of
hotel and when the demand is revealed (Van Mieghem, 2003). Oversupply may occur
regardless of the hotelier’s intention to overbuild due to unforeseeable demand shocks. Easy
procurement of funds and expected property appreciation could have led to overbuilding, in
turn, resulting in oversupply. At the same time, oversupply may not always be a consequence
of overbuilding. Given the demand uncertainty, there is always possibility of incidental

under- or oversupply, even when the industry itself does not engage in overbuilding.
Other complexities are also noted. For example, Laventhol and Horwath (1988)
argued that it was a combination of oversupply and reduced demand that led to hotel
bankruptcies. Nelson (1992) posited that oversupply of rooms and weaker economy together
created a buyer’s market for rooms. Walker (1993) identified the problem Texas lodging
industry faced as “not sluggish demand growth so much as oversupply”. Separation of supply
and demand, however, may be equivocal. According to Kummerow (1999), oversupply is the
state in which supply-demand imbalance exists so there is excess capacity. In other words,
oversupply may be a result of abundant supply and/or lack of demand due to bad economic
conditions, but it cannot be established independent of demand.
Adding to confusion is the misconception on undersupply. Under-capacity, or lack of
supply with respect to demand is likely to lead to higher prices and occupancy rates for the
incumbent suppliers. Therefore, the result of undersupply may seem desirable for existing
hotels (Woodworth & Mandelbaum, 2010). Yet, presence of unsatisfied demand suggests that
the industry has potential revenue that is not realized. Conversely, if supply of the US lodging
industry remains at under-capacity, hotels could sell out their rooms at a high price but the
overall output (or revenue) would be degraded in the long term (Brown & Dev, 1999). Such
scenario may not be the case for a competitive market like the lodging industry though, as
new entrants would start rushing in as soon as they discover the business opportunity.
Conceptually, if there exist such points of capacity level as under- or overcapacity, an
optimum level should also exist. Further, if under- or oversupply induce suboptimal outcomes,
the industry should be reluctant to add capacity just as much as they are to reduce capacity.
Assuming that the industry adjusts capacity based on reasonably accurate demand forecasts,
and that capacity adjustment strictly observes the optimum level, oversupply and undersupply
should be realized with an equal likelihood. Nevertheless, undersupply has rarely been an
issue, whereas a sizable number of publications have been concerned with overcapacity. Thus
the research inquiry is summarized into two questions. First, were there overcapacity cycles
in the US lodging industry as the literature cites? Second, if there were overcapacity cycles,
were they a result of irrational overbuilding? To answer these questions, however, evaluation
of the optimum capacity level is crucial, and estimating oversupply requires a reference point.
Following this line of reasoning, there are identifiable theoretical gaps and empirical
questions in the literature on the US lodging industry supply. The inability to determine the
optimal capacity implies for the academia lack of a valid measure to assess adequacy of room
supply as well as the underlying forces driving oversupply cycles. Practitioners are left to
make uninformed decisions on capacity, although the consequences of overcapacity are well
known and likely to last as the excess capacity does not dissipate quickly (Chon & Singh,
1993). Therefore, the current study purports to fill this gap by developing a general concept
of optimum capacity under the economic theory of fundamental price, which argues that price
is an outcome of the market equilibrium between supply and demand (Hott & Monnin, 2008).
Specifically, the objectives of this study are to 1) develop a theoretical model to determine
optimal capacity of the lodging industry, 2) estimate using a econometric model the optimal
capacity of the US lodging industry between 1987 and 2010, and 3) examine the historical
capacity mismatch during this period. Relevant implications for the industry and suggestions
for future research are presented with the findings of the study.

II. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
2-1.Optimal Supply in the US lodging industry
Dev and Hubbard (1989) first noted oversupply in the US lodging industry in the late
1980s to early 1990s. Regarding the disappointing performance of the Texas lodging industry
in the 1980s, Walker (1993) claimed that oversupply was the main cause. Singh and Kwansa
(1999) revealed through a panel discussion that the overbuilding in 1980s led to tighter
lending terms and scarcity of capital for the lodging industry from 1990 to 1993. Yet another
cycle of oversupply was predicted for the US lodging industry in the late 1990s by Rushmore
(1998). Mao and Gu (2007) later verified the oversupply in the early 2000s, to which the
authors attributed depressed room rates, occupancy, and revenue. Recently, Woodworth and
Mandelbaum (2010) indicated that the industry is again experiencing an oversupply of rooms
since 2008, citing declining profits for the industry as evidence.
While many studies directly linked oversupply to industry performance, others have
emphasized the importance of supply-demand framework in price determination. Overstreet
(1989) argued that excess rooms on the market caused the hotels to achieve lower average
daily rates. Examining the room demand and supply of Las Vegas hotels, Tsai et al. (2006)
posited that hotels’ bottom line is affected by the interrelationship between room supply and
demand. More explicitly, Pan (2007) interpreted room supply as a constraint on hotels’
pricing strategy with respect to demand. It is observed that in general, the literature interprets
effect of capacity mismatch in terms of supply-demand interaction. In essence, overcapacity
is expected to limit the industry’s pricing ability by the law of supply and demand.
However, presumably due to the favorable statements of the hotels, consequences of
undersupply have not received as much attention. Lack of market supply with respect to
demand may result in higher occupancy and average daily rates for incumbent hotels, but
they may have occurred in lieu of potential sales that could have been generated by adding
capacity (Brown & Dev, 1999). Acknowledged this dilemma, deRoos (1999) contended that
unutilized capacity is justified as long as changes in average daily rate are not triggered,
taking an important step of identifying investment opportunity in an industry where capacity
cannot be fully utilized. Yet deRoos (1999) provides inconclusive evidence as absorbing new
demand does not constitute optimum alone. If benefit from improved pricing ability is greater
than that from selling more rooms at lower price, adding new rooms is not optimal. Thus the
current study tests for optimality of capacity level that does not induce changes to room rates,
using the supply-demand framework of fundamental price.
2-2. Effective Supply and Natural Occupancy Rate
Hotel rooms can never be fully utilized. Due to persistent seasonality decision on
room capacity must be made between the two extremes of demand cycles. Room capacity
will be set so that there is some overcapacity in slow seasons, provided that in times of high
demand it will generate higher revenues (Kalnins, 2006). While the same applies to each city,
state, or region managing their supply so that the “average” potential outcome is optimized,
the industry is aggregation of all properties. It immediately follows that industry supply is
also subject to demand-driven cycles. This suggests that the optimal capacity of the lodging
industry can be expressed as a ratio between demand and rooms, or an occupancy percentage.
Persistent surplus of rooms indicates that there is always some inefficiency with
aggregate supply. At aggregate level, not all rooms are equally demanded or substitutable

among one another as the demand is selective. Time of year or location of room demanded
differs greatly. Hence equilibrium is likely to be set between demand and effective supply, the
supply that can meet actual demand, not the total supply. This frictional hangover of idle
supply is shown in Figure 1,, theorized by deRoos (1999) as the “natural occupancy rate,” an
a
analogue of Friedman’s natural rate of unemployment in aggregate economy (Salop,
(Salop 1979).
Since some capacity is ineffective:
ineffective (QTS–QES), equilibrium is reached at P*, where QD=QES.
Natural occupancy rate is:: (QES/QTS), or the percentage of rooms that meet the
t demand. It is
worthwhile to note (QTS–QES) is not oversupply.. If the rooms were perfectly substitutable for
effective supply, the equilibrium would be at QD=QTS, and price would be set below P*.

Figure 1.
1 Natural Occupancy Rate
The question of how to determine what “optimum” is subsequently arises.
arises One could
argue that when demand increases to QD’, occupancy will increase to QES’/QTS without
adding any capacity and the hotel would enjoy higher room rates at P** (undersupply
equilibrium).. However, if rooms are added to absorb the demand, price change will be
compensated by room sales.. In Figure 1,, increasing the total supply proportionate to demand
so that new effective supply becomes QTS will leave the price unchanged
hanged at P*. Therefore,
what is considered optimum should be a comparison of the area under the intersections
between the demand curve and supply level, which is equivalent to the industry revenue.
2-3.
3. Uncertainty and Oversupply
It is important to reiterate
rate that choices on capacity are made before demand is known.
At best, the individual has a good estimate of the future demand (Van Mieghem,
Mieghem 2003). If the
capacity decision is inevitably under demand uncertainty, it is logical that uncertainty will
play a role.. Harrison and Van Mieghem (1999) argue
argu that capacity can never be optimal and
there is always some degree of capacity imbalance, although optimal ex ante strategy can be
constructed for expected demand. If the optimal ex ante strategy is equal to expected demand
and the demand is realized so that the forecasting error is approximately normally distributed,
it would be reasonable to assume that under- and oversupply cycles should occur randomly.
However, continuous
ous oversupply by the industry would suggest that either there is
consistent forecasting bias so that the predicted demand is always overestimated,
overestimat
or excess
capacity was intentionally chosen. With application of improved forecasting tools by the
lodging industry (Weatherford & Kimes, 2003), persistent inaccuracy in forecasting is
unlikely. More convincing would be the latter.
latter For example, Abel (1983) argued that in a
competitive industry firms can respond to demand uncertainty by increasing their capacity.
Paraskevopoulos, Karakitsos, and Rustern
Rustern (1991) found that demand uncertainty, along with
inter-temporal
temporal rationality, can lead to periods of substantial overcapacity.
capacity. In summary, there

may be an incentive to intentionally oversupply under demand uncertainty.
2-4. Equilibrium Determination of Price
In “fundamental” price theory, demand and supply determine price through
equilibrium (Hott & Monnin, 2008; Quigley, 1999). Excess supply degrades pricing ability,
whereas lack of supply results in higher guest bids. This relationship can be represented as:
Pt = f(QDt, QSt)

(1)

where P is the price of hotel rooms, QD is the number of rooms demanded, QS is the number
of room in supply, and subscript t denotes the month. At t, supply of room is exogenous, as it
is committed prior to t. The demand is endogenous, as hotels practice revenue management to
respond to demand shifts. Expressed with a matrix of exogenous variables X, the demand is:
QDt = f(Pt, Xt)

(2)

We propose that average price for a hotel room, Pt*, is determined by the equilibrium
between demand and supply at every time point, Qt*=QDt=QSt. Greater demand will shift the
price upward, whereas an increase in supply will force the price downward, and according to
deRoos’ (1999), a revenue-maximizing demand-to-supply ratio will exist so that it satisfies:
∆P/∆QD + ∆P/∆QS = 0

(3)
III. DATA AND METHODS

3-1. Sample and Data
Monthly data of the US lodging industry on average daily rates (ADR), room supply,
and rooms sold from January 1987 to June 2010 was obtained from Smith Travel Research.
ADR was deflated using consumer price index (CPI). Historical series are shown in Figure 2.
Seasonality seems to be distinct throughout the period, while supply shows some signs of
efforts to align with demand. Data is not adjusted for seasonality to preserve variance (Tang
& Jang, 2010), while under the equilibrium framework seasonal price variation should be
explained by relative demand and supply. Since level data renders difficulty in interpretation,
natural logs of the series were taken to utilize a log-linear form, also known as the elasticity
model. Furthermore, as the strictly positive series suggest that they are integrated of order one
(Wooldridge, 2009), mean-reverting processes of first differences were used.

Figure 2. Historical ADR, Supply, and Demand of US Lodging Industry

3-2. Functional Form
The following log-difference equation was used to examine the effect of relative
changes in supply and demand on relative changes of the fundamental room rate:
∆ln(ADRt) = β0 + β1∆ln(NIGHTt) + β2∆ln(ROOMt) + εt

(4)

where ADR is the industry average daily rate, NIGHT is rooms sold, ROOM is the number of
rooms in supply, and ε is the error term. It is also noteworthy that E(β0) = 0, since no change
in fundamental price should follow if relative supply and relative demand remain same.
In the demand equation, the lagged price variable was used as an instrument to avoid
endogeneity (Canina & Carvell, 2005). Although GDP is commonly cited as the most
powerful explanatory variable for lodging demand (Smith, 2008), GDP series is only
available in quarterly form. Therefore, the Coincident Index (CI) developed by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia was utilized. The CI is constructed from four indicators of nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, unemployment rate, and
wage and salary disbursements, deflated by CPI, and set to trends in GDP. The index provides
researchers with a comprehensive measure of economic activity and is used to characterize
business cycles (Owyang, Piger, & Wall, 2005). After including monthly dummies to account
for seasonality, the demand equation is specified as:
∆ln(NIGHTt) = β3 + β4∆ln(ADRt-1) + β5∆ln(CIt) + β6-16ΣM1-11 + υt

(5)

where CI is the Coincident Index and M1–11 are the monthly dummies (base=January). The
simultaneous equations (4) and (5) are estimated by three-stage least squares (3SLS) method
and also two-stage least squares (2SLS), while the former is advocated for efficient estimates
of endogenous equations system compared to latter (Tamirisa & Igan, 2008).
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4-1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the data. Real ADR had a mean of $51.17
and a standard deviation of $2.74, indicating little change in the fundamental price for rooms
during the period. ROOMS and NIGHT consistently and significantly deviate from the mean
with considerable variance, displaying high seasonality. Similarity between CI and CPI
should also be noted. This implies that if the average daily rates are not deflated by the CPI,
high multicollinearity will be inevitable between the CI and ADR.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (N=282)
Variable

Definition

Mean

Minimum

Maximum

St. Dev

ADR
ROOMS

ADR deflated by CPI
Room supply

51.17
119,112,766

45.13
80,472,336

57.69
150,187,808

2.74
16,751,548

NIGHT
CI
CPI
M1~11

Rooms sold
Coincident index
Consumer Price Index
Monthly dummies

73,730,982
149.72
149.24
–

44,712,378
100.00
100.00
–

99,595,040
194.67
197.81
–

12,597,165
29.49
27.49
–

4-2. Estimation Results
Table 2 shows estimation results. The demand equation is consistent with the
preceding literature (Canina & Carvell, 2005). 1% increase in average daily rates leads to
roughly .33% decrease in demand the following month, while 1% increase in Coincident
Index leads to 1.19% demand increase. Significance and magnitude of monthly dummies
underscore the high seasonality of room demand. The price equation yielded interesting
results. Demand and supply variables were both significant at p<.01. 1% increase in room
nights, ceteris paribus, leads to approximately .15% increase in ADR, while 1% increase in
supply causes about .16% decrease in ADR, all others same. That one-percent increases in
both room nights and supply causes the room rate to drop slightly suggests the US lodging
industry had a slight oversupply during the period. The size of the intercept is very close to
zero, while its statistical significance is extremely low. The interpretation is intuitive in that
without changes in relative supply and demand, the equilibrium room rate will not change.
Table 2. Estimation Results
Variable

2SLS
ߚመ

3SLS

se(ߚመ )

t-stat

ߚመ

se(ߚመ )

z-stat

Dependent variable: ∆ln(NIGHTSt)
∆ln(ADRt-1)
–0.342***
∆ln(CCIt)
1.287*
FEBDUMMY
0.018*
MARDUMMY
0.136***
APRDUMMY
–0.077***
MAYDUMMY
–0.008
JUNDUMMY
0.014*
JULDUMMY
0.007
AUGDUMMY
–0.055***
SEPDUMMY
–0.166***
OCTDUMMY
–0.007
NOVDUMMY
–0.226***
DECDUMMY
–0.190***
Constant
0.045***

0.127
0.513
0.009
0.008
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.007
0.006
0.006
0.008
0.006
0.005

–2.70
2.51
2.01
16.03
–12.64
–1.38
2.29
1.08
–8.43
–25.74
–1.23
–29.73
–31.48
9.00

–0.328**
1.188*
0.020*
0.140***
–0.072***
–0.004
0.018**
0.009
–0.053***
–0.163***
–0.006
–0.223***
–0.188***
0.043***

0.123
0.498
0.009
0.008
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.007
0.006
0.005

–2.66
2.38
2.22
16.90
–12.22
–0.77
3.15
1.54
–8.37
–26.08
–1.09
–30.18
–32.00
8.77

Dependent variable: ∆ln(ADRt)
∆ln(NIGHTSt)
0.154***
∆ln(ROOMSt)
–0.163***
Constant
–0.000

0.011
0.022
0.001

13.62
–7.45
–0.27

0.154***
–0.163***
–0.000

0.011
0.022
0.001

13.69
–7.49
–0.27

N=280; Superscripts denote: ***: p<0.001; **: p<0.01; *:p<0.05
Demand equation (2SLS) R2:0.96; F-stat: 518 (3SLS) R2:0.96; χ2:7100; Price equation (2SLS) R2:0.43; F-stat: 94 (3SLS) R2:0.43; χ2:191

4-3. Equilibrium Analysis
Accordingly, the demand-to-supply ratio that does not change room rates can be
computed. ADR will not change when 1% increase in room nights is compensated with
a .9456% increase in room supply. From the data, we compute that it is optimal to add
approximately 1.535 rooms for every additional room night per day. Alternatively, the
optimal average occupancy can be calculated so that the proportionate percentage changes of
demand and supply do not influence room rates. Solving for this ratio using the geometric
mean of room nights and supply yields QS*=65.13%. At this occupancy level, simultaneous
one-percent increases in both demand and supply will not affect the room rates.
The results further prove that industry revenue is maximized when the demandsupply equilibrium is consistently reached so that price change is not induced, as Figure 3
illustrates. The initial equilibrium is at E1. If the demand for rooms increases from QD to QD’
but the effective room supply remains the same (E1 → E2), the ADR increases from P to P’

which implies that there is some unsatisfied demand (undersupply equilibrium). If the 1.535
rooms were to be added per additional room night, (QES → QES’), ADR would remain
unchanged, and room night increase would be from QES → QES’ at E3, which imposing
symmetry, is twice of that at undersupply equilibrium. E4 is the oversupply equilibrium,
where the effective
tive supply is increased but demand remains the same, thereby pushing the
ADR down from P to P’’ although quantity remains the same at QES. It is observed that there
is little incentive for the industry to undersupply, as approximately one percent of room sale
loss only translates to increase in room rate by .154%. The effect of oversupply, on the other
hand, is not seen as harmful. With 1% of oversupply the room rate would be competed down
by .163%, while there is still no loss in room sales.

Figure 3. Price Equilibrium
E
at Under, Optimum, and Oversupply
versupply
4-4. Effect of Uncertainty
Unfortunately, capacity management relies on expectations of future demand from
imperfect forecasts. The industry must decide on the optimal level of supply to maximize
revenue based on a reasonably good forecast with some probability distribution. In order to
evaluate the best strategy before demand is known, we can look at the expected outcome of
deviations from the optimum capacity when the supply-demand
supply demand mismatch occurs. To
illustrate this, numerical simulations are presented in Figure 5, a (11ⅹ11)
(11 11) matrix of outcomes
based on supply and demand changes using the estimated coefficients from Table 2. Since
demand is revealed after supply is fixed, the column is chosen by the industry and then the
row is unveiled. The optimal ex post outcome is shown in bold for each demand level, which
is realized when percentage changes in demand and supply are exactly matched. However,
assuming that the respective demand level is realized with equal probability (each cell having
one-eleventh
eleventh probability), the best ex ante strategy for the lodging industry is to maintain
approximately 4% of excess supply over the optimal level.
Table 3.. Expected Outcome based on Equally Distributed Errors
E
Demand
Change
–5%
–4%
–3%
–2%
–1%
0%
+1%
+2%
+3%
+4%
+5%
Average

-5%
-4.96%
-4.82%
-4.67%
-4.52%
-4.37%
-4.23%
-4.08%
-3.93%
-3.78%
-3.64%
-3.49%
-4.23%

-4%
-5.12%
-3.97%
-3.82%
-3.67%
-3.52%
-3.37%
-3.23%
-3.08%
-2.93%
-2.78%
-2.63%
-3.46%

-33%
-5.27%
5.27%
-4.13%
4.13%
-2.98%
2.98%
-2.83%
2.83%
-2.68%
2.68%
-2.53%
2.53%
-2.38%
2.38%
-2.23%
2.23%
-2.07%
2.07%
-1.92%
1.92%
-1.77%
1.77%
-2.80%
2.80%

-2%
-5.42%
-4.28%
-3.13%
-1.98%
-1.83%
-1.68%
-1.53%
-1.38%
-1.23%
-1.07%
-0.92%
-2.22%

Supply Change
-1%
0%
+1%
-5.58% -5.73% -5.89%
-4.44% -4.59% -4.75%
-3.29% -3.45% -3.61%
-2.14% -2.30% -2.46%
-0.99% -1.15% -1.31%
-0.84%
0.00% -0.16%
-0.69%
0.15% 0.99%
-0.53%
0.31% 1.15%
-0.38%
0.46% 1.30%
-0.23%
0.62% 1.46%
-0.07%
0.77% 1.61%
-1.74% -1.36% -1.06%

+2%
-6.04%
-4.90%
-3.76%
-2.62%
-1.47%
-0.33%
0.83%
1.98%
2.14%
2.29%
2.45%
-0.86%

+33%
-6.19%
6.19%
-5.06%
5.06%
-3.92%
3.92%
-2.78%
2.78%
-1.64%
1.64%
-0.49%
0.49%
0.66%
1.81%
2.97%
3.13%
3.29%
-0.75%
0.75%

+4%
-6.35%
-5.21%
-4.08%
-2.94%
-1.80%
-0.65%
0.50%
1.65%
2.80%
3.96%
4.12%
-0.73%

+5%
-6.50%
-5.37%
-4.24%
-3.10%
-1.96%
-0.82%
0.33%
1.48%
2.63%
3.79%
4.95%
-0.80%

As the probability distribution in Table 3 is unrealistic for any modern forecasting
model, a normal probability density function was used to replicate a matrix that better
visualizes industry practices. Table 4 shows the outcome matrices, assuming that demand
forecast errors (in percentages) are normally distributed with zero mean and standard
deviations of 1~3. Each cell contains the sum of products between probability density and
expected revenue change at respective supply levels. By examining Table 4, the relationship
between forecasting accuracy and oversupply becomes evident. As the error variance
increases, the expected outcome deteriorates. Moreover, the industry’s ex ante position
improves by adding supply. The best strategy for room capacity increases by one percent as
the standard deviation of the error increases by 1. Under imperfect forecasting, the US
lodging industry is better off to maintain excess capacity with respect to the expected demand
level than under-capacity. Overcapacity will not necessarily result in optimal outcome, but it
offers the highest expected revenue ex ante given some probability distribution of future
demand, especially those resembling a normal distribution.
Table 4. Expected Outcome based on Normally Distributed Errors
Demand change

Supply Change
0%
+1%

–5%
Standard deviation = 1
E(Outcome) -4.23%

–4%

–3%

–2%

–1%

+2%

+3%

+4%

+5%

-3.37%

-2.53%

-1.69%

-0.94%

-0.43% -0.26% -0.34%

Standard deviation = 2
E(Outcome) -4.23%

-3.39%

-2.58%

-1.85%

-1.24%

-0.80%

-0.56% -0.49% -0.54% -0.66% -0.81%

Standard deviation = 3
E(Outcome) -4.23%

-3.42%

-2.70%

-2.06%

-1.52%

-1.12%

-0.84%

-0.49% -0.65% -0.81%

-0.69% -0.65% -0.69% -0.80%

Considering effects of uncertainty, we now turn to adequacy of the historical capacity
of the US lodging industry using the optimal occupancy rate: QS*=65.13%. Oversupply of
rooms is defined as the actual supply of rooms less the optimal supply of rooms (demand
multiplied by 1/.6513), divided by total rooms for percentage figures. Uncertainty is
accounted for by adding two percent excess capacity to the optimal supply, which would have
been the best ex ante strategy assuming the standard deviation of forecasting error is 2. Figure
4 displays the historical capacity adequacy of the industry between 1987-2010. The upper
curve represents the historical changes in actual overcapacity, while the bottom curve
represents overcapacity with respect to the best ex ante capacity strategy.

Figure 4. Identified Overcapacity Pattern in the US Lodging Industry, 1987–2010
While overcapacity persisted throughout the period, after accounting for uncertainty
the excess supply was largely within the boundary of reasonable strategic decisions. There

were even periods when the industry supply was lower than the level that would maximize
expected outcome, for example in 1989 and from 1994 to 1997. Quantity oversupplied was as
well very small, and not surprisingly, these periods are considered as prosperous periods for
the industry (Woodworth & Mandelbaum, 2010). Three distinctive peak periods are noted,
however, for years 1991, 2001~2003, and 2008~2010. These periods approximately coincide
with the recessionary periods defined by National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER),
while the 2001 decline in demand is also accounted for by the September 11 attacks.
Although caution should be used, the results seem to suggest that overcapacity is not caused
by aggressive overbuilding, but rather by unexpected demand shocks. Nevertheless, an
upward trend in the magnitude and duration of overcapacity is witnessed, as the market
continuously grows and capacity reduction is intricate. From the results we recommend that
capacity managers in the industry should carefully consider broader economic cycles as well
as macro socio-economic events occurring with low probability. Similar to the collapse of
financial market, capacity planning of the lodging industry may have suffered from use of
Gaussian-family probability distributions vulnerable to extreme events (Poon et al., 2004).
V. CONCLUSION
This study identified the theoretical gap and empirical questions in the literature on
oversupply of the US lodging industry and provided a conceptual framework of optimum
capacity based on the theory of fundamental price. As expected, estimation through a
simultaneous equations model revealed that US lodging industry had historical oversupply,
and an optimum capacity level existed as a ratio to the total demand of 1.53, or equivalently
as an occupancy rate of 65.13%. Undersupply offered little benefit from price gain compared
to the loss of potential room sales. On the contrary, the effect of oversupply was not as
detrimental, as the loss in average daily rate was not sizable relative to the potential loss in
room sales. Consequently, overcapacity of the industry was justified to some extent.
Another interesting finding was the effect of uncertainty on industry supply. It was
observed that as uncertainty increases, the industry could be better off by adding more supply
than indicated by the optimum level. No matter how much the technique improves, there will
always be some error associated with the forecast of future demand, which implies that some
oversupply will be always justified for the industry. An examination of the historical
oversupply showed that although the US lodging industry persistently recorded overcapacity,
it did not greatly deviate from the optimum level, given the inherent uncertainty. The results
suggest that overcapacity may not be due to irrational overbuilding, as the industry clearly
has an incentive for excess capacity. It is noted, however, that the capacity planners in
industry may have been relying on forecasting models that are vulnerable to extreme events.
Contributions of the study are threefold. First, in line with the work of deRoos (1999),
the study enhances the field’s understanding of capacity for lodging firms. As there will
always be some inefficiency with hangover capacity “naturally unoccupied,” the optimal
number of rooms should be greater than the total room nights sold in a given period. Second,
the study identifies the capacity optimum for the US lodging industry using revenuemaximizing framework, which in turn would enable better assessment of historical capacity
levels and effectiveness in future capacity management endeavors. Third, the effects of
under- and oversupply are jointly observed, proving that undersupply is less desirable for the
industry than oversupply, especially when demand is unknown and forecasts are imperfect.
This study is not without limitations. The equilibrium model assumes relatively
constant structure of the aggregate supply and demand, such as geographic distribution of the

hotels and demand cycles. In practice, some other objective may be used to identify optimum
capacity, while it should be noted that views of what is an optimum level may vary by
individual firms. In addition, the long-run effect of capacity addition on demand generation
could be another factor that could be incorporated into decision making. Nevertheless, the
current study is expected to contribute significantly in developing a common understanding
on overcapacity and identifying the optimum capacity level of the US lodging industry. In
this light, further studies on criteria of determining the optimal capacity level, use of new and
detailed data, and improvement of the endogenous model are warranted. These efforts should
be consistently made into the future, as the trend in oversupply may be a signal that the
research has, to a large extent, ignored the importance of supply-demand match to date.
VI. REFERENCES
Abel, A. (1983). Optimal investment under uncertainty. American Economic Review, 73, 228-233.
Brown, J. R., & Dev, C. S. (1999). Looking beyond REVPAR: productivity consequences of
hotel strategies. Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, 40(2), 23-33.
Canina, L., & Carvell, S. (2005). Lodging demand for urban hotels in major metropolitan
markets. Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Research, 29(3), 291-311.
Chon, K., & Singh, A. (1993). Current economic issues facing the US lodging industry,
International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management, 5(3), 3-9.
deRoos, J. A. (1999). Natural occupancy Rates and Development Gaps. Cornell Hotel and
Restaurant Administration Quarterly, 40(2), l4-22.
Dev, C. S., & Hubbard, J. E. (1989). A strategic analysis of the lodging industry. Cornell
Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, 30 (1), 19-24.
Ferreira, R. R., & Gustafson, C. M. (2006). Declining memberships during an economic
downturn in U.S. private clubs. International Journal of Hospitality & Tourism
Administration, 7, 3-17.
Grenadier, S. R., (1996). The Strategic Exercise of Options: Development Cascades and
Overbuilding in Real Estate Markets. Journal of Finance, 51, 1653–1679.
Harrison, J. M., & Van Mieghem, J. A. (1999). Multi-resource investment strategies: operational
hedging under demand uncertainty. European Journal of Operational Research, 113(1), 17-29.
Hott, C., & Monnin, P. (2008). Fundamental real estate prices: an empirical estimation with
international data. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 36(4), 427-450.
Kalnins, A. (2006) Markets: the US lodging industry. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(4), 203-218.
Kim, H., Gu, Z., & Mattila, A. S. (2002). Hotel real estate investment trusts’ risk features and
beta determinants. Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Research, 26(2), 138-154.
Kummerow, M., (1999). A System Dynamics Model of Cyclical Office Oversupply. Journal
of Real Estate Research, 18(1), 233-255.
Laventhol and Horwath (1988) Hotel Industry Insights 1, l-4.
Mao, Z., & Gu, Z. (2007). Risk-Adjusted STOCK Performance. International Journal of

Hospitality & Tourism Administration, 8(4), 77-98
Nelson, R. (1992). Current issues in hotel room rate discounting. Journal of Hospitality &
Leisure Marketing, 1(1), 71-75.
Overstreet, G.A. (1989) Profiles in hotel feasibility: the consequences of overbuilding.
Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, 29, 10-18.
Owyang, M.T., Piger, J., & Wall, H. J. (2005). Business cycle phases in U.S. States. The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(4), 604-616.
Pan, C.-H., (2007). Market demand variations, room capacity, and optimal hotel room rates.
International Journal of Hospitality Management, 26(3), 748-753.
Paraskevopoulos, D., Karakitsos, E., & Rustern, B. (1991). Robust capacity planning under
uncertainty. Management Science, 37(7), 787-800.
Poon, S.-H., Rockinger, M., & Tawn, J., (2004). Extreme Value Dependence in Financial Markets:
Diagnostics, Models and Financial Implications. Review of Financial Studies, 17, 581-610.
Quigley, J.M. (1999) Real estate prices and economic cycles. International Real Estate
Review, 20(1), 1-20.
Rushmore, S. (1998). Get ready for another round of overbuilding. Lodging Hospitality, 54(2), 10.
Rushmore, S., & Baum, E. (2002). Growth and development of the hotel-motel industry. The
Appraisal Journal, 70(2), 148-162.
Singh, A.J. & Kwansa, F.A. (1999) Financing the lodging industry in the next millennium.
International Journal of Hospitality Management, 18(4), 415-425.
Smith, R.A. (2008) Lodging tries to pick up the pieces as link to GDP shatters. Cornell
Hospitality Quarterly, 49, 349-350.
Tamirisa, N.T, & Igan, D.O. (2008) Are weak banks leading credit booms? Evidence from
emerging Europe. Comparative Economic Studies, 50(4), 599-620.
Tang, C-H, & Jang, S. (2009) The tourism-economy causality in the United States: A subindustry level examination. Tourism Management, 30(4), 553-558.
Tsai, H., Kang, B., Yeh, R. J., & Suh, E. (2005). Examining the hotel room supply and
demand in Las Vegas: A simultaneous equations model. International Journal of
Hospitality Management, 25(3), 517-524.
Van Mieghem, J. A. (2003). Capacity Management, Investment, and Hedging: Review and
Recent Developments. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, 5(4), 269-302.
Walker, B. H. (1993). What’s ahead: A strategic look at lodging trends. The Cornell Hotel and
Restaurant Administration Quarterly, 34(5), 28-34.
Woodworth, R.M., & Mandelbaum, R. (2010) Seventy-five years of U.S. hotel revenues,
expenses, and profits. Cornell Hospitality Quarterly, 51(1), 20-26.
Wooldridge, J.M., (2002) Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data, MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass.

